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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This case is before the Court on a writ of certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals. The 
Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Responding within minutes to a report of someone screaming for help at 3:14 a.m., 
police found only one person at the scene, defendant, who was walking down a dead end 
road carrying two cloth bags. After defendant gave police an inconsistent answer regarding 
his intended destination, the officers retained his license to run a warrants check. 
Did police have the minimal level of justification necessary to temporarily detain 
defendant for further investigation? 
Standard of Review. This Court reviews for clear error the factual findings underlying 
a trial court's decision to grant or deny a motion to suppress. State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, f 
8, 6 P.3d 1133. The Court "review[s] the trial court's conclusions of law based on these 
findings for correctness, with a measure of discretion given to the trial judge's application of 
the legal standard to the facts." Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const amend IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant was charged with possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, 
and possession of marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. R. 3-4. He moved to suppress 
evidence seized from his person and bag in a search incident to arrest, arguing that his 
detention for a warrants check was not supported by reasonable suspicion. See R. 53-70. 
After ahearing, the trial court denied his motion. R. 78-81 (Addendum B); R. 110-11.1 The 
court of appeals granted defendant's petition for interlocutory appeal, and in a 2-1 published 
memorandum decision, reversed. State v. Markland, 2004 UT App 1, 84 P.3d 240. 
The trial court's findings were based on evidence taken from both the suppression 
hearing (Addendum C) and the preliminary hearing (Addendum D). See R. 1-2, 10. 
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SUMMARY OF FACTS 
At 3:14 a.m. on April 30, 2001, the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office received a 
report that a woman was "screaming or crying out for help" in an area just east of the 
Bridgeside Landing Apartments. R. 111:3-4,7,10. Deputy Ed Spotten and his partner were 
dispatched to the location and arrived within five minutes of the report. R. 51; R. 111:3-6. 
The deputies turned onto a dead end road just east of the apartments. R. 111:3-6. The road, 
which was not lit, led to a basketball court and a fenced bike path with a locked gate. R. 
111:3-5,8. 
When Deputy Spotten turned onto the road, he saw defendant, carrying two "over-the-
shoulder" bags, walking down the road toward the locked gate. R. 111: 6, 8. No one else 
was in the area. R. 111: 6. After pulling up next to defendant, the deputies exited their patrol 
car and initiated contact with defendant. R. 111: 7. On inquiry, defendant denied hearing 
anyone scream for help. R. 111:7. Deputy Spotten asked defendant where he was going. 
R. I l l : 10-11. Although defendant told the officers he was walking home (some twenty 
blocks away), there was no way for him to get there the way he was walking. R. 111:10-11; 
R. 80. 
Deputy Spotten asked defendant for his name and some identification so he could run 
some "checks" on him. R. 49; R. 111: 9,12. Deputy Spotten retained the identification and 
radioed dispatch requesting a criminal history and warrants check. R. 49-50; R. 111: 9. In 
less than five minutes, dispatch notified Deputy Spotten that there was a warrant for 
defendant's arrest. R. 111:9-10. Deputy Spotten arrested defendant on the warrant, and in a 
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search incident to arrest, found methamphetamine in the pocket of defendant's jacket and 
crushed marijuana in one of his bags. R. 46-47; R. I l l : 10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Responding within minutes to a report of someone screaming for help at 3:14 a.m., 
police found only one person at the scene, defendant, who was walking down a dead end 
road carrying two cloth bags. After defendant gave police an inconsistent answer regarding 
his intended destination, the officers retained his license to run a warrants check. The police 
had reasonable suspicion based on the following facts: (1) a citizen reported that a woman 
was screaming for help just east of the apartments; (2) deputies observed defendant in the 
vicinity of the disturbance within minutes of the report; (3) it was in the middle of the night 
(3:14 a.m.) and no one else was in the area; (4) defendant said he was walking home, which 
was nearly twenty blocks away; and (5) defendant could not get home in the direction he was 
walking. These facts, viewed together, supported a reasonable inference that criminal 
activity involving defendant "may be afoot." Defendant's brief detention for a warrants 
check was therefore justified and the court of appeals' opinion should be reversed. 
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ARGUMENT 
DEFENDANT'S BRIEF DETENTION TO RUN A WARRANTS 
CHECK WAS SUPPORTED BY REASONABLE SUSPICION 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and 
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the 
persons or things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend. IV. In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968), the 
U.S. Supreme Court observed that the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to mean that 
"police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judicial approval of searches and 
seizures through the warrant procedure " However, as in Terry, "we deal here with an 
entire rubric of police conduct—necessarily swift action predicated upon the on-the-spot 
observations of the officer on the beat—which historically has not been, and as a practical 
matter could not be, subjected to the warrant procedure." Id. Accordingly, Deputy Spotten's 
decision to check defendant for warrants "must be tested by the Fourth Amendment's 
general proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures." Id. 
In order to assess the reasonableness of a stop, courts must "'balancfe] the need to 
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.'" Id. at 20-21, 88 
S.Ct. 1879 (citations omitted). Terry recognized that the government has a legitimate 
interest in effective crime prevention and detection. Id. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. As a result, 
the Court held, "a police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate 
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manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even 
though there is no probable cause to make an arrest." Id. (emphasis added). 
The Terry stop, as it has come to be known, is justified "if the officer has a reasonable 
suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity 'may be afoot,' . . . . " United 
States v. &?£oW,490U.S. 1,7,109S.Ct. 1581,1585 (1989) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 
88 S.Ct. at 1884-85); accord State v. Kohl, 2000 UT 35, «| 11, 999 P.2d 7. In other words, a 
Terry stop may not be based on "inarticulate hunches." Terry, 392 U.S. at 22, 88 S.Ct. at 
1880. On the other hand, "the likelihood of criminal activity need not rise to the level 
required for probable cause, and it falls considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of 
the evidence standard." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 S.Ct. 744, 751 
(2002). Accordingly, "[a] determination that reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule 
out the possibility of innocent conduct." Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277, 122 S.Ct. at 753. Simply 
put, there need only be articulable facts from which an officer can reasonably infer that 
criminal activity "may be afoot." See Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. 
When examining an investigatory stop, "it is imperative that the facts be judged 
against an objective standard: would the facts available to the officer at the moment of the 
seizure or the search 'warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken 
was appropriate?" Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). In 
assessing reasonable suspicion, "[cjourts must view the articulable facts in their totality and 
avoid the temptation to divide the facts and evaluate them in isolation from each other." 
State v. Warren, 2003 UT 36, % 14, 78 P.3d 590. "In considering the totality of the 
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circumstances, [courts should] "'judge the officer's conduct in light of common sense and 
ordinary human experience... and [ ] accord deference to an officer's ability to distinguish 
between innocent and suspicious actions.5" State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160, If 8,47 P.3d 
932 (quoting United States v. Williams, 211 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)); accord 
Warren, 2003 UT 36, at fflf 20-21 (holding that courts should consider an officer's subjective 
assessment of the facts). 
Applying the reasonable suspicion standard here, the objective facts confronting the 
deputies at the time of the detention reasonably suggested that criminal activity involving 
defendant "may be afoot." Terry, 392 U.S. at 30, 88 S.Ct. at 1884. Deputy Spotten and his 
partner responded to the Bridgeside Landing Apartments within minutes of a report that a 
woman was "screaming or crying out for help." R. 111: 3-4,7,10. To reach the location of 
the reported disturbance, the deputies turned onto a dead-end road that ran behind the 
apartments and saw defendant walking down the road carrying two "over-the-shoulder" 
bags. R. I l l : 3-6, 8. No one else was in the area. R. I l l : 6. Defendant denied hearing 
anything and told the officers that he was walking home. R. 111: 10-11. Yet, "there was no 
way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed.. . ." R. 79: ^ f 13. 
R. I l l : 10-12. Defendant was walking to an area that he could not pass—at the end of the 
road was a six-foot fence, with a locked gate. R. I l l : 3-5, 12. At best, defendant would 
have been required to scale a locked and gated fence. R. I l l : 12. 
The deputies' suspicions, therefore, were not based on an "inarticulate hunch," but on 
the following facts: (1) a citizen reported that a woman was screaming for help just east of 
7 
the apartments; (2) deputies observed defendant in the vicinity of the disturbance within 
minutes of the report; (3) it was in the middle of the night (3:14 a.m.) and no one else was in 
the area; (4) defendant said he was walking home, which was nearly twenty blocks away; 
and (5) defendant could not get home in the direction he was walking. These facts, viewed 
together, supported a reasonable inference that criminal activity involving defendant "may be 
afoot." 
Although the scream for help and defendant's presence and activities in the immediate 
vicinity of the scream could be explained as innocent, "'officers need not close their eyes to 
suspicious circumstances.'" Beach, 2002 UT App 160, at f 11 (quoting Williams, 271 F.3d 
at 1270). While the scream for help may have been precipitated by an injury or some other 
innocent cause, the deputy could reasonably infer that it was precipitated by an assault, rape, 
robbery, or other crime. That inference was bolstered where the scream occurred in the 
middle of the night and raised enough concern that a citizen reported it to police. And while 
defendant's presence in the area might have been wholly innocent, the deputy could 
reasonably infer that defendant was the cause of the scream for help—not only was he found 
walking in a peculiar area at an unusual time, but he was spotted within minutes of the 
disturbance, in the very vicinity where it reportedly occurred, and was the only person in the 
area. SeeR. 111:3-4,7,10. 
Additionally, defendant told the deputies that he was walking to his home some 
twenty blocks away. R. I l l : 10-11. Yet, the dead end road upon which he traveled did not 
lead him home or anywhere else. R. 111: 10-11; R. 80: ^ j 2(c). Like unprovoked flight, an 
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answer that is inconsistent with the facts "is not necessarily indicative of wrongdoing, but it 
is certainly suggestive of such." Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124-26, 120 S.Ct 673, 
676-77 (2000) (finding reasonable suspicion based on defendant's presence in high crime 
area and unprovoked flight); accord United States v. Grant, 349 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 
2003) (holding that an inconsistent story adds to reasonable suspicion), cert denied,—U.S. 
—, 124 S.Ct. 1526 (2004); United States Pena, 920 F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(recognizing that inconsistent answers concerning destination adds to reasonable suspicion). 
The court of appeals observes, however, that the facts known to the officers at the 
time were at least as consistent with lawful behavior as with criminal behavior. See id. at f f 
7, 9 & n.3 (citing Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, \ 19, 998 P.2d 274. In applying 
such a test, the court of appeals impermissibly elevates the reasonable suspicion standard to a 
level that approximates, if not exceeds, the probable cause or preponderance of the evidence 
standards. Less than two years ago, the U.S. Supreme Court held that "[a] determination that 
reasonable suspicion exists . . . need not rule out the possibility of innocent conduct." 
Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 277,122 S.Ct. at 753. Indeed, the Fourth Amendment "accepts the risk 
that officers may stop innocent people." Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126,120 S.Ct. at 677. Where 
reasonable suspicion exists, officers are permitted to "detain the individuals to resolve [any] 
ambiguity." Id. at 125, 120 S.Ct. at 677. 
Moreover, this case is distinguishable from State v. Carpena, 1\A P.2d 674 (Utah 
1986), and State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah App. 1987), upon which the court of 
appeals relied. See Markland, 2004 UT App 1, at \ 8. 
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In Carpena, a patrol officer stopped a car with out-of-state license plates that was 
moving slowly through a burglary-prone neighborhood late at night. After specifically 
noting that no criminal activity was observed by the officer and that "no report of a burglary 
had been reported to the police that night" the Supreme Court concluded that the officer did 
not have reasonable suspicion to make the stop. Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675 (emphasis added). 
In Trujillo, an officer stopped the defendant, who was carrying a knapsack, and two 
companions at 3:30 a.m. after he observed them walking slowly down a sidewalk and 
peering into window displays. Specifically noting that the officer "could not recall receiving 
reports of any criminal activity in the area that morning/' the court of appeals concluded that 
the stop was not supported by reasonable suspicion. Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89. 
These cases stand for the settled principle that "traveling at what may seem a 
suspicious time in a suspicious location alone is insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137,143 (Utah App. 1997). However, these cases 
also implicitly hold that the result would be different if there had been afresh report of 
possible criminal activity. 
Relying on Trujillo, the court of appeals equates a recent report of screaming for help 
in the area with a general "high-crime factor in the area." Morkland, 2004 UT App 1,^8. 
Trujillo does not support that proposition, but the contrary. The officers in Trujillo based 
their stop "merely on the lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area." 739 
P.2d at 89. Trujillo held that these factors alone were insufficient to establish reasonable 
suspicion, but specifically suggested that additional information from the suspect or a recent 
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"report[ ] of any criminal activity in the area" would have created reasonable suspicion. Id. 
Marklandis therefore in direct conflict with Trujillo, which distinguishes the two factors and 
gives virtually controlling weight to the recent report of possible criminal activity. 
As noted, the two deputies in this case observed defendant walking alone at 
approximately 3:15 a.m. "down a dead-end road 'where he could not get anywhere.'" 
Markland, 2004 UT App 1,16 (quoting trial court's findings and conclusions at R. 80:1 
2(c)). If the deputies had only these facts before them, the detention would have been 
unlawful under controlling precedent. See Humphrey, 937 P.2d at 143 (holding that 
"traveling at what may seem a suspicious time in a suspicious location is insufficient to 
establish reasonable suspicion"). They had more. Indeed, the deputies had the very fact 
Carpena and Trujillo suggested would be sufficient under such circumstances to establish 
reasonable suspicion—a fresh report of possible criminal activity in the location defendant 
was seen traveling. See Carpena, 714 P.2d at 675; Trujillo, 739 P.2d at 89. 
The majority below also reversed in large measure based on its assertions that 
"Deputy Spotten did not testify that he had any suspicions of criminal activity concerning 
Defendant" and "did not make a connection between Defendant and the reported screaming." 
Id. at 11 7-9. To the contrary, Deputy Spotten testified that defendant was suspicious 
because he was "in the area where the call came from," he was in a "dead end area," it was 
"3:00 in the morning," and he was "in the back of a complex where he does not live." See R. 
I l l : 12-13. Deputy Spotten also noted that defendant could not get home the way he was 
walking. R. 111:10-12. In other words, Deputy Spotten testified that his own evaluation of 
11 
the circumstances led him to suspect that defendant was connected to a crime that 
precipitated a scream for help. Therefore, the majority's reliance on State v. Chapman, 921 
P.2d 446 (Utah 1996), and Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55, 998 P.2d 274, where the 
officers testified that they had no suspicions of criminal wrongdoing, was misplaced.2 
* * * 
In summary, the facts and circumstances before Deputy Spotten " ' warranted] a man 
of reasonable caution in the belief that the action taken was necessary." Terry, 392 U.S. at 
21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880 (citations omitted). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse the 
judgment of the court of appeals. 
To the extent the court of appeals' opinion holds that reasonable suspicion requires 
an officer to provide the trial court with a subjective basis for an investigative stop, it is 
clearly incorrect. Although an officer's subjective assessment of the facts is an appropriate 
factor to consider in determining the reasonableness of a stop, "an officer's subjective belief 
alone is insufficient to validate or invalidate" a Terry stop. See Warren, 2003 UT 36, at ^[ 
20-21 (referring to a Terry frisk). As held in Terry, "the facts [must] be judged against an 
objective standard," not a subjective one. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1880. 
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Respectfully submitted August 265 2004. 
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UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL 
5Y S. GRAY 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS Pauistte Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
00O00 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David Roger Markland, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20020965-CA 
F I L E D 
(January 2, 2004) 
2004 UT App 1 
Third District, Salt Lake Department 
The Honorable William Barrett 
Attorneys: Linda M. Jones and Nisa J. Sisneros, Salt Lake City, 
for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Davis, and Greenwood. 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Kl David Markland, Defendant, was charged with possession of 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and with possession of 
marijuana, a class B misdemeanor. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) (2002) . Defendant moved to suppress the evidence, 
arguing that his detention was not supported by reasonable 
suspicion and the ensuing search was therefore illegal. The 
urial court denied the motion to suppress and Defendant 
petitioned for an interlocutory appeal, which this court granted. 
The issue before this court is whether the trial court properly 
denied Defendant's motion to suppress. We reverse. 
\2 Defendant argues that the State failed to establish a 
reasonable suspicion to support the level two detention. 
"[W]hether a particular set of facts gives rise to reasonable 
suspicion is a question of law, which is reviewed for 
correctness." State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996) 
(citing State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 (Utah 1994)). "However, 
we conduct our review with a measure of discretion given to the 
trial judge's application of the legal standard to the facts." 
State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322,117, 57 P.3d 1098 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
t3 The parties do not dispute that a level two detention 
occurred when the police retained Defendant's identification 
while they ran a warrants check; instead, they dispute whether 
the detention was legal. This court has noted that one level of 
"constitutionally permissible encounters between law enforcement 
officers and the"public" is a level two detention, whereby "an 
officer may seize a person if the officer has an 'articulable 
suspicion' that the person has committed or is about to commit a 
crime; however, the 'detention must be temporary and last no 
longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.' 
Salt Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,1110, 998 P.2d 274 (quoting 
State v. Deitman, 739 P.2d 616, 617-18 (Utah 1987) (per curiam)" 
(citations omitted)). Defendant argues that Deputy Spottenfs 
level two detention was not based on an "articulable suspicion" 
that Defendant had "committed or [was] about to commit a crime." 
Id. 
1[4 If a level two detention is not "'supported by reasonable 
suspicion(, it] violates the Fourth Amendment to the United 
States Constitution.'" Ray, 2000 UT App 55 at Hl8 (quoting State 
v. Bean", 869 P.2d 984, 988 (Utah Ct. App. 1994)). "In 
determining whether the officers had a reasonable articulable 
suspicion to justify Defendant's temporary detention, we 'look to 
the totality of the circumstances . . . to determine if there was 
an objective basis for suspecting criminal activity.1" State v. 
Beach, 2002 UT App 153,1(8, 47 P. 3d 932 (alteration in original) 
(quoting State v. Humphrey, 937 P. 2d 137, 141 (Utah Ct. App. 
1997)) . Further, when "considering the totality of the 
circumstances, we 'judge the officer's conduct in light of common 
sense and ordinary human experience . . . and we accord deference 
to an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions.'" Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
United States v. Williams, 271 F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)). 
1[5 Deputy Spotten testified that he and another officer 
responded to a call from dispatch at approximately 3:00 a.m. The 
dispatch stated that someone was heard screaming near the east 
side of the Bridgeside Landing apartment complex. When the 
officers arrived, Defendant was the only individual in the area, 
and he was walking down a dark street, carrying two over-the-
shoulder cloth bags, toward what appeared to be a dead end. 
Deputy Spotten testified that he stopped Defendant and inquired 
whether Defendant had heard any screaming. Defendant responded 
he had not. When asked where he was going, Defendant said he was 
walking home. Deputy Spotten asked Defendant's name and 
destination, and then requested Defendant's identification. 
Deputy Spotten took Defendant's identification and ran a warrants 
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check. Upon discovering Defendant had an outstanding warrant, 
Deputy Spotten arrested Defendant and conducted a search pursuant 
to the arrest. 
i[6 When asked at the hearing what was suspicious about 
Defendant's behavior, Deputy Spotten responded that "the fact 
that [Defendant] was in the area, it's dark out there, it's a 
dead end area[J . . . and he's in the back of a complex where he 
does not live." Deputy Spotten did not testify to any objective 
or subjective connection he made between Defendant and the 
reported screaming. Nevertheless, based on this testimony, the 
trial court found "that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable 
articulable [suspicion] based on the following": the deputy 
received a report of a cry for help in the area where Defendant 
was, it was late and not well-lit, Defendant was headed down a 
dead-end road "where he could not get anywhere," Defendant "said 
he was going home"to a location that he could not get to by 
traveling in the direction he was headed," and Defendant was 
carrying two bags. 
^7 Although we grant the trial court a measure of discretion in 
its application of the legal standard to the facts, see State v. 
Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322, %7, 57 P.3d 1098, we disagree with 
its determination that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable 
articulable suspicion that Defendant was engaged in, or about to 
engage in, criminal activity. Deputy Spotten did not testify 
that he had any suspicions of criminal activity concerning 
Defendant. See, e.g., State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 453 (Utah 
1996) ("By the officers' own testimony, no independent facts 
surrounding the encounter with [the defendant] created suspicion 
that he was involved in any illegal activity . . . . " ) . In Salt 
Lake City v. Ray, 2000 UT App 55,119, this court held that the 
officers did not have a reasonable suspicion "on which to justify 
the level two stop, and the seizure, therefore, violated" the 
defendant's Fourth Amendment rights. This court noted that "the 
facts known to the officers regarding [the defendant] were at 
least as consistent with lawful behavior as with the commission 
of a crime." Id. (footnotes omitted). Further, this court 
noted, "By [the officers'] own testimony, [they] had no knowledge 
of any violation of the law that [the defendant] might have 
committed or was about to commit." Id. 
U8 In this case, as in Ray, the officers responded to a 
suspicious circumstances call, yet they did not observe, have 
knowledge of, or have suspicions about any crime that had been 
committed or was about to be committed, let alone any crime 
Defendant had committed or was about to commit. Although this 
case is distinct from Ray, based in part on the lateness of the 
hour and the recent report of screaming in the area, this court 
has held that a "decision to stop . . . based merely on the 
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lateness of the hour and the high-crime factor in the area," was 
insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion of criminal 
conduct. State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987). In Truiillo, the officer observed a trio of men walking 
along State Street, in the dark, through what was considered a 
high-crime area. See id. The officer was suspicious about a 
knapsack one of the men was carrying, although he never inquired 
about it.1 See id. Further, once the officer stopped the men, 
they appeared "nervous." Id. This court held that the officer 
"did not articulate reasonable objective facts for suspecting 
[the defendant] had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal 
conduct." Id. at 90. 
f9 Finally, the totality of circumstances in this case is 
insufficient to support "an objective basis for suspecting 
criminal activity." State v. Beach, 2002 UT App 160,^8, 47 P.3d 
932 (quotations and citation omitted). Defendant was in the area 
of the "suspicious circumstances" dispatch, the area was dark, he 
was carrying two bags, and he was heading down what the officer 
thought was a dead-end road. Although "'we accord deference to 
an officer's ability to distinguish between innocent and 
suspicious actions,'" id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 271 
F.3d 1262, 1268 (10th Cir. 2001)), these circumstances are not 
sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion.2 Deputy Spotten 
did not observe Defendant engaged in illegal activity; he did not 
articulate any grounds for believing that Defendant was, or was 
1. In both State v. Truiillo, 739 P.2d 85, 89 (Utah Ct. App. 
1987), and this case, the officers were concerned about bags the 
respective defendants were carrying. However, in neither case 
did the officers inquire about the bags. Additionally, neither 
officer could "articulate what concerned him about" the bags in 
question. Id. 
2. Compare State v. Fridleifson, 2002 UT App 322,^14, 57 P.3d 
1098 (affirming lower court's finding of reasonable suspicion to 
investigate the defendant where the defendant was seen near drug 
house under surveillance, was told it was the site of illegal 
drug transactions and to leave, yet the defendant returned to the 
house, parked in a less conspicuous spot, left his engine 
running, and ignored the officer's questioning upon leaving the 
house), with State v. Svkes, 840 P.2d 825, 828-29 (Utah Ct. App. 
1992) (holding police lacked reasonable suspicion to detain 
defendant based on her three minute presence in drug house under 
surveillance). 
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about to be, engaged in criminal activity; and he did not make a 
connection between Defendant and the reported screaming.3 
fllO Based on the foregoing, we disagree with the trial court's 
determination that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable suspicion to 
support the level two detention of Defendant. Therefore, we 
reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's motion to 
suppress and remand the case for further proceedings as may now 
be appropriate. 
BENCH, Associate Presiding Judge (dissenting): 
1|l2 I dissent. I believe that, at the time he took Defendant's 
identification, Deputy Spotten had reasonable suspicion to detain 
Defendant to investigate his possible involvement with a reported 
cry for help. 
Kl3 In the middle of the night, at about 3:00 a.m., the Salt 
Lake County Sheriff's Office received a report that a woman was 
3. Further, case law indicates that where an officer observes 
behavior that is consistent with illegal activity, officers may 
have reasonable suspicion to investigate. Compare State v. 
Beach, 2002 UT App 160,1|9, 47 P.3d 932 (holding that where 
officer "observed specific behavior that reasonably led him to 
suspect that" the defendant was engaged in illegal activity, 
officer had reasonable suspicion); with State v. Swanigan, 699 
P.2d 718, 719 (Utah 1985) (per curiam) (holding officer's stop of 
two individuals unconstitutional where stop was based on 
description by another officer, who merely saw individuals 
walking down street at 1:40 a.m., in area where recent burglary 
reported). In this case, however, Deputy Spotten did not observe 
Defendant engaged in behavior consistent with illegal activity. 
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screaming and crying out for help in an area just east of the 
Bridgeside Landing Apartments. Deputy Spotten and his partner 
were dispatched to the location and arrived within five minutes. 
To reach the location of the reported disturbance, Deputy Spotten 
turned onto a dead-end road that ran behind the apartments. At 
the end of the road was a six-foot fence, with a locked gate that 
led to a bike path. 
i[l4 When Deputy Spotten turned onto the road, he saw Defendant 
walking toward the locked gate, carrying two "over-the-shoulder" 
bags. Defendant was the only person the officers saw in the 
vicinity. The officers pulled up next to Defendant and exited 
their patrol car. Deputy Spotten told Defendant they had 
received a report that someone in the area had been screaming for 
help and asked Defendant if he had heard anything. Defendant 
replied that he had not. Deputy Spotten then asked Defendant 
where he was going. Defendant told the officers that he was 
walking home, but the route he was traveling was blocked off and 
the address he gave was nearly twenty blocks away. 
1|l5 Deputy Spotten asked Defendant for his name and some 
identification so he could run some "checks" on him. Deputy 
Spotten retained the identification and radioed dispatch, 
requesting a criminal history and warrants check. Less than five 
minutes later, dispatch notified Deputy Spotten of a warrant for 
Defendant's arrest. Deputy Spotten arrested Defendant on the 
warrant and, incident to that arrest, searched Defendant's person 
and the two bags he was carrying. Deputy Spotten found 
methamphetamine in the pocket of Defendant's jacket and crushed 
marijuana in one of the bags. 
1|l6 Under the totality of the circumstances, the objective facts 
known to Deputy Spotten at the time of the detention reasonably 
suggested "that criminal activity may be afoot." Terry v. Ohio, 
392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 (1968). "Although each of 
the series of acts was 'perhaps innocent in itself,' . . . taken 
together, they 'warranted further investigation.'" United States 
v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 274, 122 3. Ct. 744, 751 (2002) 
(citation omitted). 
Hl7 According the trial court the proper "measure of discretion" 
to apply the law to the facts, see State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 
939 (Utah 1994), I would affirm the order denying Defendant's 
motion to suppress. 
Russell W. Bench, ^—-
Associate Presiding Judge 
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Addendum B 
DAVE) E. YOCOM 
District Attorney for Salt Lake County 
MICHAELA D. ANDRUZZI, 7804' 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 363-7900 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
DAVED ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
Hon. William W. Barrett 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress came before this Court for hearing in the above entitled 
matter on September 10, 2002. Defendant was represented by counsel, Nisa Sisneros, and the 
State was represented by counsel, Michaela D. Andruzzi. The Court having read memoranda 
submitted by counsel, and considered arguments of counsel, hereby enters its FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On April 30, 2001, at 3:14 am, Deputy Edward Spotten (Hereinafter Deputy Spotten) 
received a dispatch to that informed him that someone was crying out for help in the east part 
of the apartment complex on Bridgeside Landing which has its entrance on Sunstone Road at 
500 West. 
2. The road that runs through the eastern part of the apartment complex ends in a dead-end. 
3. At the dead-end there is a basketball court, a bike path that was gated and locked at the time, 
and the Jordan river. 
4. There was no lighting at that end of the road. 
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5. Deputy Spotten arrived at the apartment complex within 5 minutes. 
6. Upon arriving at the eastern part of the complex, Deputy Spotten saw the defendant, David 
Roger Markland, walking towards the dead-end of the road carrying two bags. 
7. Deputy Spotten did not see anyone else in the area. 
8. Deputy Spotten pulled up next to the defendant and asked him his name. 
9. Deputy Spotten told him that he received a report of screams for help in that area and asked 
the defendant if he had heard anything. 
10. The defendant responded that he had not heard anything. 
11. Deputy Spotten asked the defendant where he was going. 
12. The defendant responded that he was going home to 13th East and 45th South. 
13. There was no way for the defendant to get home walking in the direction he was headed 
when Deputy Spotten stopped him. 
14. Deputy Spotten then asked the defendant for identification and told him he was going to 
check for warrants. 
15. There was a warrant for the defendant and deputy Spotten arrested the defendant. 
16. The subsequent search incident to arrest yieled marijuana, methamphetamine, and drug 
paraphernalia. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The State concedes that the stop was a level-two stop requiring reasonable articulable 
suspicion. 
2. The Court finds that Deputy Spotten had a reasonable articulable based on the following five 
factors: 
a) The deputy received a report that someone was crying for help five minutes earlier in 
the area where he found the defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No. 011906683 
Page 3 
b) It was late at night and the area was not well lit. 
c) The defendant was headed down a dead-end road where he could not get anywhere. 
d) The defendant said he was going home to a location that he could not get to by 
traveling in the direction in which he was headed. 
e) The defendant was carrying two bags with him. 
ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing facts and conclusions the Court enters the following order: 
Defendant Markland's motion to suppress is denied. 
DATED this Co day of October, 2002. 
Approved a s ^ form: 
Sisneros 
BY T$E jCOURT: 
tiJu./Jk-
Honorable William W. Barrett 
Third District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact And 
Conclusions Of Law was delivered to Nisa Sisneros, Attorney for Defendant David Roger 
Markland, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 on the 7- day of 
September, 2002. 
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Addendum C 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
DAVID ROGER MARKLAND, 
Defendant. 
CaseNo.011906683FS 
Appellate Case No. 20020965-SC 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS HEARING ON SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 
BEFORE 
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT 
DEC
 3 I 2002 
B y _ SALT^_g^NTy 
CAROLYN ERICKSON, CSR 
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIBER 
1775 East Ellen Way 
Sandy, Utah 84092 
801-523-1186 
I N * 
APPEARANCES 
For the Plaintiff: MICHAELA ANDRUZZI 
ASSISTANT DISTRICT ATTORNEY 
For the Defendant: NISA J. SISNEROS 
LEGAL DEFENDER'S ASSOCIATION 
INDEX 
WITNESS PAGE 
EDWARD SPOTTEN 
Direct Examination by Ms. Andruzzi 2 
Cross Examination by Ms. Sisneros 11 
1 SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - SEPTEMBER 10, 2002 
2 HONORABLE WILLIAM W. BARRETT, JUDGE PRESIDING 
3 P R O C E E D I N G S 
4 MS. SISNEROS: Your Honor, we're ready on Markland. 
5 THE COURT: Markland? Okay. 
6 MS. SISNEROS: Let me grab my witness. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. This is State of Utah vs. David 
8 Markland, case number 011906683. Appearances please. 
9 MS. SISNEROS: Nisa Sisneros for Mr. Markland. 
10 MS. ANDRUZZI: Michaela Andruzzi on behalf of the 
11 State, your Honor. 
12 THE COURT: One [inaudible] one witness, Ms. 
13 Andruzzi? 
14 MS. ANDRUZZI: I'm not sure we're even going to need 
15 him but he's here. 
16 THE COURT: Sorry? 
17 MS. ANDRUZZI: I'm not sure we'll need him, but he's 
18 here in case we do. It would just be one witness. 
19 THE COURT: Just one. Okay, do you want to call your 
20 first witness then? I'm going to invoke the exclusionary rule, 
21 so if there's anybody here who ought not to be here, send them 
22 out. 
23 MS. ANDRUZZI: There wouldn't be anybody else. Your 
24 Honor. Attached to Ms. Sisneros's motion, she's attached a 
25 preliminary hearing transcript. The State was planning on just 
1 
1 relying on that unless the Court wanted more information. 
2 THE COURT: Well, let me refresh my memory. Oh, 
3 yeah, okay, I'm with you here. Do you have your officer? 
4 Let's hear what he has to say. 
5 MS. ANDRUZZI: All right. The State would call 
6 Detective - or, sorry, Officer Spotten to the stand. 
7 EDWARD SPOTTEN 
8 having been first duly sworn, testified 
9 upon his oath as follows: 
10 DIRECT EXAMINATION 
11 BY MS. ANDRUZZI: 
12 Q Will you state your name and spell your last name for 
13 the record please? 
14 A Edward Spotten, last name spelling S-P-O-T-T-E-N. 
15 Q Thank you. And what is your occupation? 
16 A Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office. 
17 Q How long have you been a deputy for Salt Lake County? 
18 A Two years eight months. 
19 Q Is that the extent of your law enforcement 
20 experience? 
21 A No. 
22 Q What prior experience do you have? 
23 A I worked for Logan City PD as a reserve for about 
24 five months. 
25 Q Are you POST certified? 
2 
1 A I am, 
2 Q Were you employed by Salt Lake County on April 30 of 
3 the year 2001? 
4 A Yes. 
5 Q And what was your duty assignment on that date? 
6 A I was working the area of Taylorsville to patrol that 
7 beat. 
8 Q Great. Were you on duty at approximately 3:14 a.m.? 
9 A I was. 
10 Q Do you recall receiving a dispatch to a certain 
11 location on that date and at that time? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. What was the nature of the call? 
14 A She called it in the east part of the complex of 
15 Ridgeside Landing that there was somebody screaming or crying 
16 out for help. 
17 Q Okay. And when you say the east side of the complex 
18 of Ridgeside Landing, is that in - is that an area that's know 
19 as Sunstone Road? 
20 A Sunstone Road actually is the entrance to the 
21 complex. 
22 Q All right. 
23 A The east side goes back into the complex a ways, and 
24 back past the buildings and back in there there's a little dead 
25 end area where there's some basketball courts and then if you 
3 
1 go over further there's actually the Jordan River. 
2 Q All right. Well, let's talk about that area. The 
3 area that you received the call that there had been some cries 
4 for help; is that correct? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q All right. And now, any area that these cries for 
7 help came from, were there residences? 
8 A The area would be east of the complex area. 
9 Q Okay. 
10 A There's actually - there's a row of complex buildings 
11 all together, and then there's a road that goes back in where 
12 they actually have a basketball court and -
13 Q And is that the area that you were going? 
14 A That's where they said that they heard the screams. 
15 It's actually in that area and right next to that area is also 
16 the Jordan River. It's just a dark wooded area back in there 
17 too. 
18 Q You've got the river, you've got basketball courts 
19 and a dead end road? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Is there any access to that dead end road other than 
22 the one entrance that you now proceeded to? 
23 A No. 
24 Q Okay. Were there any houses on that dead end road? 
25 A No. 
4 
1 Q Are there any apartments on that dead end road? 
2 A No. 
3 Q There's a basketball court, is there also a bike 
4 path? 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q Okay, Is there an entrance to that bike path? A 
7 gate? 
8 A I think it's locked. 
9 Q All right. 
10 A As I recall it was locked and somebody recently tore 
11 the gate off, but at that time it was locked. 
12 Q All right. And what about the basketball courts? 
13 Were they also - was there a gate to get into those? 
14 A There's no - there's no gate, it's just right on the 
15 side of the road. 
16 Q All right. So this is 3:14 a.m.? 
17 A Yes. 
18 Q All right. How long did it take you to respond to 
19 that call? 
20 A I was there pretty quick. I was in the area as I 
21 recall. 
22 Q Give us an estimate when you say pretty quick do you 
23 mean one to two minutes? Two to three minutes? 
24 A Within five minutes. 
25 Q Within five minutes. 
5 
1 A I don't know the exact amount of time. I don't 
2 recall. 
3 Q All right. So you received a call that there were 
4 calls for help coming out from this dead end road at 3:14 a.m. 
5 A Yes. 
6 Q You responded to the area. What did you see when you 
7 got to the area? 
8 A I saw a male walking down that road. 
9 Q Okay. Was he walking away from the area in which 
10 you'd been told there were screams for help? 
11 A He was walking - trying to think which way he was 
12 walking - seems like he was walking toward the dead end part of 
13 the road. 
14 Q Did you see anybody else there? 
15 A There's nobody else there. 
16 Q Did you see the person that you saw walking on that 
17 day on the road-
18 A Yes. 
19 Q -in the courtroom? 
20 A Yes. 
21 Q Will you please point to him and tell the Court what 
22 he's wearing? 
23 A The blue suit next to the defense attorney. 
24 Q Did you subsequently obtain identification from him? 
25 A Yes. 
6 
1 Q And what was the name? 
2 A Roger Markland. 
3 MS. ANDRUZZI: May the record reflect identification 
4 of the defendant? 
5 THE COURT: It may. 
6 Q (BY MS. ANDRUZZI) When you initially saw the 
7 defendant walking on this dead end roadf what did you do? Did 
8 you approach him? What happened? 
9 A Yes. I pulled up next to him and got out of my car 
10 and made contact with him. 
11 Q Okay. At the time that you pulled up next to him 
12 were you in a patrol vehicle? 
13 A Yes. 
14 Q Did you turn your lights on? Did you have your gun 
15 pulled? 
16 A No. 
17 Q Okay. So you just pulled up next to him and you 
18 started talking to him? 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q What did you - what did you say to him? 
21 A I believe I asked him if he'd heard anything. I 
22 recounted to him that we'd had a call in the area there's a 
23 lady screaming for help, wanted to know if he heard anything. 
24 He replied he had not. 
25 Q He indicated that he had not heard anything? 
7 
1 A Right. 
2 Q All right. Did he have anything with him that seemed 
3 unusual? 
4 A He was carrying a couple of bags. 
5 Q What types of bags? 
6 A Well, they were just over-the-shoulder bags. 
7 Q Okay. So we're not talking grocery sacks? 
8 A No. 
9 Q All right. Like - like cloth bags? 
10 A Cloth bags, yes. 
11 Q He was carrying two bags? And it's 3:14 a.m.? 
12 A Right. 
13 Q Is the area well lit? 
14 A No, it's very dark. 
15 Q All right. Was there any activity going on back 
16 there that would account for his being present at that time? 
17 A Nothing. 
18 Q All right. Did you have anything else to explain the 
19 screams for help? 
20 A No. 
21 Q Okay. So you still hadn't found anything to explain 
22 that? 
23 A No. 
24 Q All right. After you asked him if he heard the 
25 screams for help, did you further detain him? 
1 A I asked him for some identification and I proceeded 
2 to identify who he was. 
3 Q And how long did that take? 
4 A To identify who he was? 
5 Q Yes. 
6 A He provided me with an i.d. 
7 Q All right. 
8 A So just a matter of seconds. 
9 Q And what did you do with that i.d.? 
10 A I checked through dispatch and ran him and checked 
11 him for - to find out what kind of history he may have had, 
12 what kind of involvements, and to check him for warrants also. 
13 Q And how long did that take? 
14 A I believe I had a response back in less than five 
15 minutes. 
16 Q Okay. Did you indicate to him that that's what you 
17 were doing with his identification? 
18 A Yeah, I did. 
19 Q Okay. 
20 A I told him I needed to run some checks. 
21 Q And what did he indicate to you? 
22 A Nothing. 
23 Q All right. When you ran the checks, what did you 
24 find out about the defendant? 
25 A It came back that he had a $5,000 warrant as I 
9 
1 recall. 
2 Q Okay. And did you arrest him on that warrant? 
3 A I did. 
4 Q All right. Subsequent to that arrest, did you search 
5 the bags? 
6 A Yes, I did. 
7 Q And at that time did you find the drugs that he had 
8 in the bags? 
9 A I believe the drugs were found in his - part of the 
10 drugs were found in his jacket pocket actually, [inaudible] 
11 search. 
12 MS. ANDRUZZI: I don't have any further questions. 
13 THE COURT: I read the transcript that he said he was 
14 going home when you asked him what he was doing. Do you recall 
15 where he lived? 
16 THE WITNESS: He stated he lived, I believe it was 
17 over in the Murray area. Probably - I can't remember the exact 
18 address. I thought he said something like 1300 East or 
19 something like that. 
20 THE COURT: And he was at 4500 South and Ridgeside 
21 Way. Where's that? 
22 THE WITNESS: Fifth West. 
23 THE COURT: Fifth West? 
24 THE WITNESS: Yeah. 
25 THE' COURT: And he's walking home at 3:14 in the 
10 
1 morning? 
2 THE WITNESS: That's what he said. 
3 THE COURT: Okay. Do you have any questions? 
4 MS. SISNEROS: Just some questions that will bring 
5 out some of the things that are in the transcript. Do you want 
6 me to question him on that or -
7 THE COURT: Well, I've just been kind of looking 
8 through the transcript, so. 
9 MS. SISNEROS: Okay. 
10 THE COURT: If you have some you want to ask go 
11 ahead. 
12 CROSS-EXAMINATION 
13 BY MS. SISNEROS: 
14 Q When you stopped Mr. Markland, you immediately tell 
15 him what - why it is that you're stopping him, right? 
16 A Yes. 
17 Q And then you asked him where he's going? Correct? 
18 And he told you he's going home. 
19 A Uh-huh (affirmative). 
20 Q And he's in the general area where where his home is? 
21 A No. He's not. 
22 Q Well, is he heading towards the area where his home 
23 is? 
24 A I'm not sure - I'm not sure exactly how he's going to 
25 get there based on the dead end road. 
11 
1 Q Okay. Well, the Jordan - he's heading towards the 
2 Jordan River area? 
3 A That's his next stop. 
4 Q Is there a walkway along the Jordan area? 
5 A It's all blocked off. There's no entrance from that 
6 complex. 
7 Q Is there any way to get into it to crawl over the 
8 gates or? 
9 A If you're going to crawl over a six foot fence. 
10 Q Okay. Then you immediately asked him for his 
11 identification? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q Okay. And then if you can recall at the preliminary 
14 hearing, I asked you if there's anything suspicious about him 
15 and do you remember me asking you about that? 
16 A Vaguely. 
17 Q Okay. And your response was that, well, he was in 
18 the area where the call came from. 
19 A Correct. 
20 Q And then I asked you was there anything else 
21 suspicious about him. And you replied no. Is that correct? 
22 A If that's what I said, that's what I said. 
23 Q Okay, so other than the fact that he's in the area 
24 and it's late at night, there's nothing more suspicious about 
25 him? 
12 
1 A Other than the fact that he was in the area, it's 
2 dark out there, it's a dead end area, as I've mentioned, 
3 Q And you mentioned that he's walking? Correct? 
4 A Correct, 
5 Q He's not running? 
6 A No. 
7 Q And there's nothing in his hand with, such as a 
8 dangerous weapon -
9 A No. 
10 Q Is he acting nervous? 
11 A I don't recall. It's been too long. 
12 Q There's nothing more about his behavior that makes 
13 you suspicious of some illegal activity? 
14 A Other than the fact he was in the area it's 3:00 in 
15 the morning, it's dark outside, and he's in the back of a 
16 complex where he does not live. 
17 MS. SISNEROS: Okay. Nothing further. 
18 THE COURT: Anything else? 
19 MS. ANDRUZZI: No. 
20 THE COURT: You can step down. Thank you. Do you 
21 want to submit it or do you want to argue or what do you want 
22 to do? 
23 MS. SISNEROS: Well, if I could just quickly. 
24 There's three levels in a stop. The first level you can stop 
25 and question the individual. The initial questioning is fine. 
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1 He's asking him what he's doing there. Once he takes his 
2 identification, he's now detained him and that has risen to a 
3 level two stop. There's no question about that. I don't think 
4 the State can -
5 THE COURT: Well, I think the State conceded that. 
6 MS. SISNEROS: Right. Okay. So the question is 
7 whether or not he was justified to raise it to a level two 
8 stop. In order to do so, an officer has to have articulable 
9 suspicion that this person has committed a crime or is about to 
10 commit a crime. That raises it to the level of reasonable 
11 suspicion. And as I've argued in my memorandum, even if you 
12 take everything that has been stated, the lateness of the hour, 
13 the area that he's in, there's just been a crime in the area, 
14 that is not enough for reasonable suspicion for a level two 
15 stop. 
16 There's definite case law that says specifically that 
17 in Humphrey, in Stewart, when you've got lateness of an hour, 
18 in an 3a where a crime has just been committed, those are 
19 cases tnat specifically that say those two taken into 
20 consideration, that's not enough. There has to be something 
21 that tells this officer there is something more going on here. 
22 He's acting nervous. He has a gun in his hand. He's got a knife 
23 readily accessible. He's running away. There's a woman standing 
24 right next to him, something that leads us to believe, yeah, 
25 this might be the person who just was involved in this crime. 
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1 There's nothing here that tells us anything more than this man 
2 is out walking around late at night. Nothing. 
3 Can you stop and question him and ask him, what are 
4 you doing? Why are you in the area? Where are you going? 
5 Yes, he can. He can - he can keep him there and continue to 
6 ask him further questions, but he doesn't do that. He 
7 immediately takes his identification and when he does that, he 
8 does it without reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime 
9 has been committed. Having done that and not having anything 
10 more specific about what it is that he thinks rises to the 
11 level of reasonable suspicion, this is an illegal stop and 
12 we're asking that you grant our motion and suppress the 
13 evidence that was found. 
14 THE COURT: Okay. Ms. Andruzzi. 
15 MS. ANDRUZZI: Thank you, your Honor. 
16 In Munson and Humphrey, the court held that lateness 
17 of the hour alone does not give rise to reasonable suspicion. 
18 There may be valid reasons for somebody to be out. It's also 
19 true that in Stewart, it indicates that a person's privacy in 
20 an area where a crime has been committed is alone not enough. 
21 But what we look at is the totality of the circumstances. We 
22 have a person who's not headed anywhere that we can see would 
23 be towards a locked gate, where he's clearly not supposed to 
24 be, or over a six foot fence to the Jordan River. He's not 
25 headed in the direction where he indicates to the officer that 
15 
1 he lives. He's in a place where a call has just come in that 
2 someone is crying out for help, it's dark, he's the only person 
3 there, and it's 3:14 in the morning. So we have more that just 
4 one or two of these factors, we have all of these factors and 
5 we look at them all together. 
6 Clearly the minimal intrusion of a five minute stop 
7 to check for someone's identification, Ms. Sisneros is correct 
8 and perhaps it wouldn't rise to the level of a level three 
9 stop, but certainly the minimal intrusion that's imposed on a 
10 defendant by requesting his identification and waiting five 
11 minutes for him to run his warrants are clearly merited by the 
12 circumstances in this case. The officer had a duty to 
13 investigate those cries for help. He has a duty to find out if 
14 this person is involved in that. Merely taking the defendant's 
15 word for it that he's not involved in somebody crying out for 
16 help would not be enough. He must do more than that. What he 
17 did was reasonable under the circumstances. He ran to see if 
18 the defendant had any prior involvement of this kind. He ran 
19 the warrant's check. Came back with the defendant had a 
20 warrant. Under the circumstances, and looking at all the 
21 circumstances, it was clearly merited by the circumstances. 
22 Thank you. 
23 MS. ANDRUZZI: Just quickly. He does have the duty 
24 to stop and question him, what he ^ doesn't have the duty to do 
25 and he doesn't have probable - a reasonable suspicion to do is 
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1 to stop and detain him. I draw your attention to State v. 
2 Truiillo, because we do have a case there, it's late at night. 
3 It's in a high crime area and we have a person walking with a 
4 knapsack in what the officer called a suspicious manner. You 
5 do have all of those situations there, and the court even in 
6 that case with all three of those factors said that's not 
7 enough. 
8 MS. SISNEROS: And, your Honor, if I could just -
9 THE COURT: Well, that's okay, because I've made up 
10 my mind. I think there's - there are a couple of added factors 
11 that played into what I believe was an appropriate stop by the 
12 officer, and that is headed down a dead end road where he can't 
13 go anywhere, can't get anywhere, is suspicious enough in my own 
14 mind. And then the fact that he said he was going home, and 
15 his home was nowhere in the area. So you not only have the 
16 three factors that you just mentioned, Ms. Sisneros, but those 
17 two additional factors that play heavy on me in terms of my 
18 belief that the officer was doing what he should have done 
19 appropriately. I believe he would have been remiss in not 
20 pursuing it further just because the whole circumstance didn't 
21 make any sense. He was there on a call and here's this guy 
22 that tells him he's going home? With no way to go home? 
23 MS. SISNEROS: Can I just address that? Because I -
24 THE COURT: No. Those are the facts that I find, and 
25 I believe it's sufficient and I'm going to deny the motion. 
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1 Ms. Andruzzi, you can prepare an appropriate order. 
2 MS. ANDRUZZI: Would the Court like findings on that, 
3 or just an order? 
4 THE COURT: I don't know. She'll probably appeal it, 
5 so I'd make findings. 
6 MS. ANDRUZZI: All right. 
7 THE COURT: So submit them to her for her approval as 
8 to form. 
9 Do we need to schedule this for trial or anything or 
10 what? 
11 MS. ANDRUZZI: We probably can schedule it for a 
12 scheduling conference. 
13 THE COURT: All right. Let's do that. Let's - let's 
14 do it on the 24"h of September at 8:30 for a scheduling 
15 conference. 
16 MS. ANDRUZZI: Thank you, your Honor. 
17 THE COURT: Okay. 
18 (Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
19 
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Addendum D 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
STATE OF UTAH V. DAVID MARKLAND 
CASE NO. 
JUDGE; (J) 
ATTORNEY FOR DEFENDANT: (D) 
ATTORNEY FOR PROSECUTION: (P) 
WITNESS #1:(W) 
WITNESS #2: (W) 
CHARGE: - 3° 
DATE OF HEARING: 
We're here in the matter of State v. David Roger Markland. Set for Preliminary Hearing. 
Case number 011906683. Mr. Markland is present with his counsel, Ms. Sisneros. Ms. 
Cook representing the State. And we're ready to proceed then? 
We are. 
Very good. Do you waive formal reading of the information, Ms. Sisneros? 
Yes, Your Honor. 
Let me just for my own information [inaudible] charges are here. Mr. Markland, you're 
charged with what appears to be two counts. And that's Unlawful Possession of a 
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, at 4517 South Bridgeside Way, Salt Lake 
County, on or about April 30lh, 2001. And it's alleged that you did knowingly and 
intentionally have in your possession a controlled substance, that being 
methamphetamine. And count II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class 
B misdemeanor, at the same place and date - the substance alleged to have been 
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marijuana. Are you ready to proceed, Ms. Cook? 
We are, Your Honor. 
Okay. 
The State calls Deputy Spotten. 
Come on up and be sworn, [witness is sworn] You may proceed. 
Thank you. Would you please state your name? 
Edward Spotten. 
And how do you spell your last name? 
S-P-O-T-T-E-N. 
What is your occupation? 
Deputy for Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office. 
How long have you been doing that? 
Two and a half years. Three years, about. 
And were you so employed on April 30th, year 2001? 
I was. 
And on that date did you have occasion to be in the area of 4517 South Bridgeside Way? 
I did. 
Is that in Salt Lake County? 
It's in Taylorsville. 
Is Taylorsville in Salt Lake County? 
Yes. It is. 
Can you tell me why you were in that area? 
Yes. We received a call because there was somebody crying out or yelling to stop. 
Something to that effect. We didn't know what it was. Kind of suspicious circumstance 
call. 
Were you sent to investigate that crying out? 
Yes. 
And when you went to that area, did you observe anything or anyone that caught >our 
attention? 
We saw a male walking away from the area where the call supposedly came in. 
Did you stop to talk with that man? 
I did. 
Do you see that male here in the courtroom today? 
I do. 
Can you please point to him and tell me what he's wearing? 
Yes. He's wearing the dark bluejacket. 
And did you later learn this male's name? 
Yes. 
What was that name? 
David Roger Markland. 
Your Honor, if the record could reflect he has identified the defendant. 
Witness has identified the defendant. 
Thank you. After you obtained Mr. Markland's name, did you do anything with that 
information? 
3 
1 W: I checked with our dispatch. Ran it for warrants. Verified his ID. Things like that. 
P: Did you discover anything? 
W: Yes, I did. 
P: What did you discover? 
W: He had a warrant for his arrest. 
P: And after learning that, what did you do? 
W: I placed him into custody and served the warrant on him. 
P: And after Mr. Markland was placed into custody, did you do anything with him then? 
W: Yes. I performed a search incident to arrest. 
P: Did you discover anything during that search? 
W: Yes, we did. We discovered some paraphernalia and some drugs. 
P: What did you have done with those controlled substances? 
W: We actually have field test kits that we carry with us. And we field tested the marijuana 
and we field tested the meth, both of which flashed positive for the substances. 
P: And do you know if those were later sent to the State crime lab? 
5 W: They were. 
7 P: Your Honor, if I could approach the witness. 
8 J: You may. 
9 P: I'm handing you what's previously been marked for identification as State's exhibit 
0 number 1. Do you recognize that? 
1 W: Yes. 
2 P: Can you tell me what that is? 
1 W: This is the results from the crime lab analysis. 
2 P: And do those results relate to this case? 
3 W: They do. 
4 P: How do you know that? 
5 W: On the top of the page here, it has the case number. 01 dash 46288. 
6 P: And is that the same as the case number in front of you? 
7 W: It is. 
8 P: Does Mr. Markland's name appear in that report? 
9 W: I believe it does. Yes. Right there. 
10 P: Your Honor, the State moves for the admission of exhibit I. 
11 J: Any objection, Ms. Sisneros? 
12 D: No, Your Honor. 
13 J: It will be received. 
14 P: Thank you. Deputy, if you would please read the results of the tox. I believe you'll find 
15 them at the bottom of the page. 
16 W: Controlled Substance Analysis. Item number 1. Methamphetamine was identified in the 
17 plastic bag. Total weight of the white crystal was 10 milligrams. Item number 3. The 
18 plastic bag was found to contain 110 milligrams of crushed marijuana. The hand-rolled 
19 cigarette was not analyzed. 
20 P: And Deputy, quickly. The tox report refers to methamphetamine found in a plastic bag. 
21 Do you recall specifically where on Mr. Markland's person the plastic bag with 
22 methamphetamine was located? 
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W: Yes, I do. 
P: Where was that? 
W: There was a white plastic container in his suit jacket. And it was inside that container. 
P: And was this a suit jacket that he was actually wearing at the time? 
W: Yes. 
P: Do you recall where the baggie of marijuana was found? 
W: It was in a black bag that he was carrying with him. 
P: Thank you. I have nothing further at this time. 
J: Ms. Sisneros? 
D: You say that you received a call that someone was crying out? 
W: Uh huh. 
D: Was this over dispatch? 
W: Yes, it was. There's a case number. If you'd like that, I can give it to you. 
D: How long would you say it took you to get to the point where you see Mr Markland? 
W: It was shortly after I arrived. I couldn't be exact. Just a few minutes. 
D: From the time that you received this call from dispatch to the time that you see Mr. 
Markland. About how much time? 
W: Maybe three or four minutes. 
D: So when you received the dispatch, where are you? 
W: I don't recall where I was. It's been a long time ago. I know it was fairly short though. 
D: Could you estimate maybe a mile? A block? 
W: I can't. I don't remember exactly where I was. I know that I responded to the call. 
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1 D: And when you arrived, did you hear anyone crying out? 
2 W: I did not. 
Did you stop and listen for a minute before you approached Mr. Markland? 
Did I stop and listen? I don't recall actually if I did stop and listen or not. I just responded 
to the area where responding to suspicious circumstance. I observed a male walking away 
from the area where there was someone crying out according to what dispatch had told us. 
So immediately when you arrive in the area, you see Mr. Markland. 
That's correct. 
Why is it that you stop and talk to him? 
He's in an area where there's no apartments. It's actually back just a little way east of the 
apartment complex. It's an area that's blocked off. There used to be an entranceway there 
from exits 4500 South and they've blocked that off so you have to come in through 
Sunstone Row. And it's dark, not a well-lit area. Which is where the crying out 
supposedly had come from. 
And what time of day is this? 
It's in the middle of the night. I can look through the report and give you the exact time if 
you like. 3:14 in the morning. 
And when you see Mr. Markland, what is he doing? 
He's walking. 
So is he walking through this blocked off area? Was he walking out of the... 
He's walking towards the area that's blocked off. 
When you see him, is he on the sidewalk still? 
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i W: It's an actual roadway. He's walking in the middle of the roadway. 
2 D: By roadway, what do you mean? 
3 W: It's like, well, it's like an entrance to a complex but it's actually like a paved road. If 
4 you're entering into a private property, a lane, maybe. Like part of a lane. Cars can travel 
5 on it. 
6 D: And he's headed into this blocked off area? 
7 W: He's headed towards the gate that's closed. Yes. 
8 D: And you said there's nothing located in that area? 
9 W: There is... I was there just recently. There's a basketball court there. There's an entrance 
0 to the bike path, which was locked at the time. 
1 D: Do you see anyone else in the area? 
2 W: There's nobody else. 
3 D: Is there anything suspicious about defendant, about this defendant that would make you 
4 think that maybe he was involved? 
5 W: Just the fact that he was there in the area where the call had came from. 
6 D: Anything else? 
7 W: No. 
8 D: When you approach him, do you ask him for his identification or do you just... 
9 W: Yes. 
0 D: ... ask him for his name? 
1. W: I asked him for ID too. 
2 D: And do you take his identification and then go check for warrants? 
8 
Yes. I got his ID and checked it for warrants. 
Before you... well, tell me. When you first initially contact him, do you immediately ask 
him for his identification? 
I ask him at some point right when we first contacted him. Yes. 
Do you tell him at all about why you're stopping him? 
Yes, I did. I told him we were investigating a suspicious circumstance. 
And does he respond to you at all about that? 
I believe. It's been a long time but I thought he said he was going home or something to 
that effect. 
Do you ask him if he's involved with someone who's been crying out or do you ask him 
why he's there? 
I don't recall. I just remember him telling me that he said he was going home. 
Do you recall any kind of a conversation about somebody having been crying out? 
I think I asked him if he heard anything. 
And do you recall what his answer was? 
It's been too long. I can't remember. 
Now you take his identification and you run it for warrants at that point? 
Yes. 
Is Mr. Markland standing? Sitting? 
Standing. 
And how far away is he from where you are? 
Five, ten feet. 
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1 D: When you run... 
2 W: There was a deputy with me at the time. 
3 D: There's another deputy? 
4 W: Yes. 
5 D: Does he arrive with you or does he arrive later? 
6 W: He was with me. 
7 D: So is he standing with Mr. Markland while you run the warrant check? 
8 W: I believe so. 
9 D: Now Mr. Markland is not handcuffed. 
0 W: No. Not at all. 
1 D: But the other officer is standing next to him. 
2 W: Correct, We watch each other. We look out for each other. That's correct. 
3 D: And then the warrant comes back at that point. And then do you arrest him immediately 
4 at that point? 
5 W: I advised him that he had a warrant and he was going to be under arrest. Yes. 
6 D: And you handcuffed him at that point? 
7 W: I did. 
8 D: And this bag that you search, is that a bag that he has in his hands or over his shoulder? 
9 W: He was carrying it on his person. How he was carrying it, I don't recall. But it was in his 
0 possession. Carrying it. 
1 D: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
2 J: Thank you. Any redirect? 
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1 P: No, Your Honor. Thank you. 
2 J: All right, Ms. Cook. Any further witnesses? 
3 P: The State rests. 
4 J: You may step down. Thank you. Anything further from counsel? 
5 D: No, Your Honor. I have advised my client that I believe he should not testify and I believe 
6 that he will be taking that advice. 
7 J: Mr. Markland, are you going to take your attorney's advice? 
8 Defendant: I am, Your Honor. 
9 J: All right. Thank you. Both sides rest, then? 
10 D: We'll submit it, Judge. 
11 J: OK. Thank you. Based on the testimony I've heard, I do find that there is probable cause 
12 to believe that both counts I and counts II, Unlawful Possession of a Controlled 
13 Substance, third degree felony, possession of a substance being methamphetamine, and 
[4 Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, the substance 
5 being marijuana did occur and that the defendant was the person that committed those 
6 offenses. Therefore, I'll bind the defendant over to answer in District Court on both 
7 offenses. 
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